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Abstract:
Sources of heterogeneity within the process of R&D investment, such as international
differences in the maximum per-period rate of investment and level of regulatory uncertainty,
offer a plausible explanation for US comparative advantage in biotechnology. Using dynamic
stochastic simulation, the results presented in this paper suggest US biotechnology firms may
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mounting R&D costs, and successfully complete more R&D projects than European firms.
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Introduction
Commercial biotechnology has been and continues to be the nearly exclusive province of
US enterprise. From the late 1970s to the present, biotechnology research and production has
concentrated in the US, rather than in other industrialized regions such as Western Europe.
Casual inspection of industry data confirms that early US dominance in biotechnology has been
perpetuated over time. In 1996, US biotechnology firms numbered 1,287 and employed 118,000
workers, compared to 716 firms and 27,500 workers in all of Europe. US firms earned $14.6
billion in revenues, dwarfing the European total of $1.4 billion. Significantly, US biotechnology
firms spent $7.9 billion on research and development (R&D); European firms spent only $1.2
billion (Ernst & Young, 1997a; 1997b).  This evidence suggests that the US holds a comparative
advantage in the biotechnology industry, vis-à-vis other Northern countries.
In this paper it is hypothesized that sources of heterogeneity within the structure of the
R&D investment process offer a plausible explanation for US comparative advantage in
biotechnology. This contrasts with existing models that ascribe heterogeneity to international
differences in resource endowments such as productive factors and knowledge stocks (Grossman
and Helpman, 1992).  In section 1, a set of stylized facts is listed that characterize biotechnology
R&D investment, and two candidate sources of heterogeneity that impact R&D investment are
identified: the per-period rate of investment and the level of uncertainty pertaining to the
domestic regulatory regime.  In section 2, a model of biotechnology R&D investment is
developed, based on an extension of Pindyck’s (1993) real options model of irreversible
investment with uncertain cost. The implications of this model for the issue of comparative
advantage in the biotechnology industry are examined in sections 3 and 4.  The paper is
summarized in section 5.2
1. Stylized Facts of Biotechnology R&D
To understand how one country can ultimately dominate an industry such as
biotechnology, a promising avenue of inquiry is the actual process of R&D investment.  An
examination of this process in the biotechnology industry yields the following six stylized facts:
(i) biotechnology R&D programs are lengthy;  (ii) R&D costs are irreversible;  (iii) R&D
investment is made up-front;  (iv) the total number of time periods required to complete an R&D
program is unknown a priori;  (v) the cost to complete an R&D program is subject to ongoing
technical and regulatory uncertainty;  and (vi) an R&D program is subject to discrete uncertainty
in the form of the possibility that the value of an investment opportunity might instantaneously
fall to zero midstream – known as a termination event.
The concepts of technical and regulatory uncertainty are borrowed from Pindyck.
Technical uncertainty arises from the physical difficulty of completing an R&D project. At the
time an R&D program is undertaken, limited information is available regarding the effort,
resources and time required to successfully realize the future payoff. Initiating the project and
completing successive stages will incrementally reveal information related to these issues. As the
investment proceeds, the barriers to completion may become higher or lower, but the true cost of
the investment is only known with certainty when the project is completed. Thus, the
“information revealing” nature of technical uncertainty enhances the incentives to commence
investment.
Regulatory uncertainty arises from unpredictable aspects of the regulatory regime
governing the completion of R&D programs, which may take the form of unpredictable
compliance costs incurred over the course of the R&D process. The level of these costs may be
higher or lower depending on how regulators respond to factors such as public opinion or safety3
concerns. In contrast to technical uncertainty, information about the regulatory regime proceeds
regardless of whether or not the firm is investing. This tends to have a dampening effect on
investment incentives, since the firm may benefit from delaying investment in order to observe
the regulatory regime and thus obtain more information about its future trajectory.
A country’s comparative advantage in commercializing new technologies can be thought
of as the ability to innovate more rapidly than rival countries. The stylized facts listed above
suggest at least two candidate sources of heterogeneity pertinent to this issue. First, since
biotechnology R&D is lengthy, the rate at which a firm can invest will have important
implications for average time to build, or equivalently, the rate of innovation. Secondly, the
presence of regulatory uncertainty and its implications for investment incentives suggests that a
reduction in the level of uncertainty surrounding the regulatory regime will reduce the incentive
for firms to delay investment in order to obtain more information about the future path of the
regulatory environment.
Evidence supports the contention that these sources of heterogeneity in fact exist in the
biotechnology industry. “In America,” The Economist (1996a, p.21) observes, “companies such
as Netscape and Genentech have sprung up to lead the Internet or biotechnology even before
such things can really be classified as industries.”  This disparity between the US and Europe
may be in part attributable to the fact that European firms face more difficulties in obtaining
investment capital.  “... [Europe] seemingly has no shortage of venture capital,” The Economist
(1996b, p.89) notes. “But most of it has been going into relatively unadventurous investments …
only a fraction has been invested in start-ups.”  In contrast, the US has a well-tested mechanism
for channeling funds to risky high technology enterprises, notably the NASDAQ equity market.4
Heterogeneity between the US and Europe also exists in the guise of domestic regulatory
regimes, especially in terms of the relative ease with which biotechnology products can gain
approval for release by national regulatory agencies. In Europe, product approval is a much more
costly and uncertain prospect than in the US. For example, in 1992, the US Food and Drug
Administration determined that genetically engineered foods would only have to satisfy the same
health and safety standards imposed on naturally occurring foods. In contrast, European
biotechnology firms face a protracted approval process, fraught with uncertainty.
It is reasonable to hypothesize, therefore, that the US biotechnology industry possesses
certain advantages that have allowed it to move ahead of its rivals through more rapid
innovation, independent of any international differences in inherited resource endowments
2.  A Real Options Model of Biotechnology R&D Investment
Real options investment models are based on three observed characteristics of
investment: it is at least partially irreversible; it is subject to ongoing uncertainty; and the timing
of the investment is at the discretion of the firm. Taking these characteristics into account, the
opportunity to invest is likened to holding a financial option, except that the option is “written”
on a real asset, rather than a financial instrument. The firm holds the right, but not the obligation,
to initiate investment. When a firm invests, it irrevocably “kills” the option to delay, and
therefore the value of this lost flexibility must be included in the cost of investment. As a result,
the return necessary to persuade a firm to invest will tend to exceed the direct cost of capital.
The model presented here is Pindyck’s model of investment with uncertain cost, extended
to include the possibility of a termination event. Consider a biotechnology firm faced with the
opportunity to invest in a new R&D project. When completed, the project will yield an asset, i.e.,
a product or process innovation, worth V with certainty. The firm holds an option to invest in this5
project which it has the right, but not the obligation, to exercise. The expected cost to
completion,  K, evolves according to:
dK = -Idt + b(IK)
1/2dW + gKdZ.( 1 )
I is the per-period rate of investment, b and g are scalars representing the level of technical
uncertainty and regulatory uncertainty, respectively, and dW and dZ are increments of standard
Wiener processes, with mean zero and variance dt.
The value of the investment opportunity, F(K,q), is subject to the possibility of a random
Poisson termination event, q:
xdq,( 2 )
where, x = -F, and dq = 1 with probability ldt, and 0 with probability (1 – ldt).  l is the
constant mean arrival rate of a termination event. Occurrence of the event implies that the value
of the project immediately falls to zero, and the project is abandoned.
In order to determine its optimal investment strategy, the firm solves the following
infinite horizon optimal stopping problem using dynamic programming:






Asset valuation in a risk-neutral economy is subject to the following relation:
rF = -I + E[dF/dt]. (4)
Applying Ito’s Lemma yields:
E[dF/dt] = -IFK + 1/2b
2IKFKK + 1/2g 
2K
2FKK - lF.( 5 )
Therefore:




which is subject to the boundary conditions:
F(0) = V
lim (K®¥) F(K) = 0
1/2b
2K*FKK(K*) – FK(K*) – 1 = 0
Value matching condition: F(K) continuous at K*.
(6) is solved numerically for K*, which is the critical cost to completion. K* represents
the maximum level of cost to completion for which investment is economically feasible. If the
initial expected cost to completion exceeds K*, the firm will not undertake the investment. If the
investment is already underway when the evolution of K crosses the K* threshold, the firm will
abandon the project midstream. The level that K* takes will depend on the exogenous parameters
in the model: V,  I,  r,  l,  b, and g.  I and g represent the sources of heterogeneity in the
biotechnology industry.
3.  Comparative Statics
To illustrate the comparative statics of the investment model described above, a
benchmark vector of exogenous parameters, [V, I, r,  l,  b,  g], is constructed from 1996 US
biotechnology industry data. In 1996, the total market capitalization of 294 publicly traded US
biotechnology companies was $77 billion. This yields an average market capitalization of
approximately $262 million per firm, which is used as a proxy for the capitalized value of a
biotechnology firm’s R&D. For simplicity, this value is assumed to be certain and time-invariant.
In 1996, the 294 biotechnology firms collectively spent $4.7 billion on R&D, or about $16
million per firm. Therefore, the maximum per-period rate of investment, I, is set to $16 million
per year. This figure can be interpreted as a supply constraint on the availability of investment
capital, dictated by the willingness of the capital market to fund biotechnology R&D. Again, it is
assumed that this figure is time-invariant. A value for l is also needed: it is assumed that the
mean arrival rate of an R&D termination event is 0.2 on a yearly basis. To complete the7
calibration, the risk-free rate of interest r is set equal to the 1996 yearly average for the one-year
Treasury index, or 5.5%.
Solving (6) numerically (see Fackler, 1996) over a range of values for b and g yields a
matrix of values for K* illustrating the relative effects of technical and regulatory uncertainty on
the critical value of cost to completion:
g = 0.0 g = 0.1 g = 0.2 g = 0.3 g = 0.4 g = 0.5
b = 0.0 102.2 92.2 85.5 80.3 75.6 71.1
b = 0.1 103.5 93.0 86.2 80.9 76.2 71.6
b = 0.2 106.7 95.4 88.2 82.7 77.7 73.0
b = 0.3 111.4 99.3 91.6 85.6 80.3 75.3
b = 0.4 117.6 104.7 96.2 89.7 83.9 78.5
b = 0.5 125.3 111.4 102.0 94.8 88.5 82.7
The results confirm the point made earlier that increases in technical uncertainty tend to
increase the critical cost to completion, i.e., enhance the incentive to invest, while increases in
regulatory uncertainty have the opposite effect. In terms of the regulatory effect, differences in
the level of g, holding b and all other exogenous parameters constant, yields substantial
differences in the critical level of cost to completion. For example, if b = 0.5, an increase in the
level of regulatory uncertainty from 0.1 to 0.2 leads to a corresponding decrease in K* of almost
ten percent – from $111.4 million to $102.0 million.
In terms of cross-country differences in the maximum per-period rate of investment I, if b
= 0.5 and g = 0.1, the effects on K* are as follows:
I 1.0 8.0 16.0 24.0 32.0
K* 21.1 78.6 111.4 132.6 148.08
As the maximum rate of investment increases, the critical value K*, below which a firm
will initiate investment or maintain an existing project, also increases. This suggests, ceteris
paribus, that a firm exhibiting a higher value of I will invest under conditions that a firm with a
lower I would find economically infeasible.  Similarly, the firm with a higher I will maintain an
R&D program under conditions that would cause a firm with a lower I to choose termination.
Cross-country differences in the maximum rate of investment or level of domestic
regulatory uncertainty result in asymmetric decision rules governing investment. For example, a
country whose capital markets are either “tight”, or whose investors are averse to high-risk
investments such as biotechnology, will tend to allocate capital less generously on a per-period
basis to its domestic biotechnology firms.  On the other hand, firms with access to more capital
will tend to innovate faster, earlier, and exhibit more perseverance in the face of mounting R&D
costs than firms less well supplied with capital. Therefore, if  US biotechnology firms invest at a
greater per-period rate, they will find a source of comparative advantage in this feature of the
structure of biotechnology R&D.
4.  Dynamic Stochastic Simulation
Dynamic stochastic simulation can be employed to assess the implications of the
investment model discussed above. Specifically, the stochastic investment environment in which
biotechnology firms operate is simulated, and the investment strategy summarized by the critical
cost to completion K* is applied within this environment, in order to generate simulated
investment behavior.
The simulation can be summarized as follows.  For each iteration, a random draw is made
from a specified interval of an initial expected cost to completion. In addition, another random
draw is made from an exponential distribution to obtain the waiting time for the first occurrence9
of a Poisson termination event. With these values in hand, the investment begins. During the
initial period of the investment, the firm checks to see if the initial K exceeds K*: if so, the firm
delays investment and observes the evolution of K, which is then driven entirely by the random
component stemming from regulatory uncertainty. Should the current value of K fall below K* at
some future date, the firm initiates the R&D project at that time. Otherwise, the firm continues to
observe K until the occurrence of the Poisson termination event, at which point the investment
opportunity becomes worthless.
Once the R&D project is initiated, the investment proceeds as follows. For each time
period, the expected cost to completion is incremented according to (1), which includes reducing
K by the firm’s maximum per-period R&D investment, and adding on the random components
brought about by technical and regulatory uncertainty, which can be positive or negative. For
each time period, the firm compares the current value of K to its critical value K*; if K exceeds
K*, the project is abandoned midstream. Also, if the current time period coincides with the time
period associated with the occurrence of the Poisson termination event, the project is terminated
immediately. Otherwise, investment continues until expected cost to completion equals zero, at
which point the R&D project has been successfully completed.
The simulation was carried out for representative US and European firms. Algorithms for
generating the random sequences driving the stochastic processes in the model are from Press et
al. (1992). The value of R&D, the risk-free rate of interest, l, and b were assumed to be the same
for both firms, and were parameterized as $262 million, 0.055, 0.067, and 0.5, respectively.
Heterogeneity was introduced by setting the maximum per-period rate of investment, I, to $16
million per year for the US firm, and $6 million per year for the European firm. These figures are
based on the average R&D expenditure in 1996 for publicly-traded biotechnology firms in the10
US and Europe. Finally, the level of regulatory uncertainty, g, was set to 0.1 for the US firm, and
0.2 for the European firm, reflecting the observation that European firms are subject to a higher
level of uncertainty pertaining to the regulatory regime than their US rivals. These exogenous
parameters are sufficient to derive the critical cost to completion for both firms, which was $143
million for the US firm, and $87 million for the European firm.
Finally, the range of values, from which the initial expected cost to completion is drawn,
was specified. This was chosen to be an interval with a lower endpoint equal to the value ten
percent lower than the K* for the European firm ($78 million), and with an upper endpoint equal
to the value ten percent higher than the K* for the US firm ($157 million). The simulation was
iterated one million times each for the US firm and the European firm. The simulation results are
summarized below:
US Firm European Firm
Mean Time to Build
(successful only) 86 months 162 months
Projects Not Started in









These results offer a striking illustration of how heterogeneity in the R&D investment
process can result in one country rapidly dominating the industry in question. Note that the US
firm exhibits, on average, a time to build of 86 months for successfully completed projects,
almost half of the European result of 162 months. Clearly, the US firm innovates more rapidly on
average than its European counterpart.11
Other simulation results offers more insight into the relative performance of the US and
European firms.  A reason for the US firm’s faster rate of innovation is the fact that, in almost 90
percent of the iterations, the European firm does not initiate investment right away, but, instead,
delays investment until the current value of K drops below the critical value of cost to
completion. In contrast, the US firm is forced to delay investment in only 20 percent of the
iterations. The necessity of delaying investment has profound implications for time to build, as
evidenced by the disparity between the US and European firms.
Another important factor contributing to the faster US innovation rate is that nearly half
of the European iterations end in the project being abandoned midstream, as a result of cost to
completion accumulating to the point that it exceeds the critical level. Clearly, this is a result of
the much lower critical cost to completion employed by the European firm as its decision
criterion for abandoning or continuing investment. This disparity has significant implications for
the total number of R&D projects successfully completed by each type of firm: the US firm
completes the project successfully in over half of the iterations, compared to less than ten percent
of the iterations for the European firm.
In sum, as a result of the heterogeneity present in the R&D process, the simulation results
indicate that, in contrast to its European rival, a representative US firm initiates more R&D
projects, commences investment sooner, innovates more rapidly, perseveres longer in the face of
mounting R&D costs, and ultimately, successfully completes more projects. Clearly, extension
of these results to an industry-level setting suggests that US firms would rapidly dominate the
industry, as in fact empirical evidence suggests has been the case in biotechnology.  This in turn
implies that the sources of heterogeneity present in the R&D process may offer a plausible12
explanation for the US comparative advantage in biotechnology vis-à-vis other Northern
countries.
5. Summary
In this paper it has been shown that a real options approach to investment provides a
plausible explanation for the fact that the pattern of specialization has located the bulk of
biotechnology R&D and production in the US, relative to other, relatively similar Northern
countries.  Contrary to other research on trade in high technology sectors, it was assumed in this
paper that country’s resource endowments are identical, and, that the source of comparative
advantage lies within the R&D investment process. In a simulation analysis, it was shown that
international differences in the maximum per-period rate of investment and the level of
regulatory uncertainty are sufficient to generate asymmetric investment behavior, and therefore
identify the world leader in biotechnology.
Given this, it is logical to ask if policy prescriptions, such as R&D subsidies, can “create”
comparative advantage in science-based, high technology industries such as biotechnology.  The
answer is a qualified “yes”: while government authorities can affect the rate of innovation, policy
intervention cannot alter the probability distribution of success or failure; rather, it can only
move firms more rapidly toward the realization of the outcome of their R&D initiatives.References
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